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Bolivia is one of  the poorest and most socially unequal countries in South America, with 
a GDP (gross domestic product) per capita of  US$4200—around one-eleventh that of  the 
United States.1 Proportionally, it has the largest indigenous population in the region and also 
one of  the largest informal sectors, accounting for roughly two-thirds of  all economic activity.2 
Rates of  music, video, and software piracy are estimated to be among the highest in Latin 
America. The most recent International Intellectual Property Alliance report on Bolivia cited 
rates of  90% for music piracy and 80% for software piracy (IIPA 2006). The current level of  
music piracy is probably similar to that of  neighboring Peru, which the IIPA listed at 98% for 
2009 (IIPA 2010). 
Bolivia has not traditionally been a large domestic producer of  pirated music and film. Until 
recently, most of  the pirated goods sold in Bolivia were imported from Peru, which has a more 
developed industrial base and a larger media sector. As in the other countries documented in 
this report, however, the plummeting cost of  reproduction equipment has fostered large-scale 
domestic production of  pirated media and much wider distribution—fueling a pirate mass 
market that has all but destroyed the tiny, vastly more expensive licit market. In the process, 
that mass market has also provided access to recorded media for the first time to an emerging 
population of  young consumers, built on Bolivia’s remarkable demographic wave (the median 
age in Bolivia is under 22, and almost 40% of  Bolivians are under 15 years of  age).
The IIPA has long called for the revision of  Bolivia’s copyright laws and for stronger 
enforcement. But beyond the creation of  a national intellectual property service (SENAPI) 
in 1999 and unfulfilled plans, in 2001, to overhaul copyright and create a special police unit 
dedicated to enforcement (in conformance with a US-led regional trade agreement), recent 
Bolivian governments have shown few signs of  interest in policy change (IIPA 2008). As in 
other countries, this outcome reflects a range of  domestic and international pressures, from the 
1 Like the Mexico chapter, this chapter is primarily a work of  individual scholarship and therefore 
provides a narrower account of  piracy than the four large country reports (South Africa, Russia, Brazil, 
and India). Its focus is music piracy, and secondarily, the optical disc market.
2  According to Schneider (2002), the informal economy—mostly street vendors and itinerant work-
ers—represents 67% of  Bolivia’s total economy. Bolivia did not figure in Vuletin’s (2008) account of  
the informal economy in Latin America. The methodological challenges of  measuring the informal 
economy make all such figures approximate and precise comparisons difficult. 
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higher priority accorded to cooperation with US efforts against 
drug trafficking to the very real prospect of  social unrest if  police 
were to disrupt informal markets on behalf  of  foreign commercial 
interests—an explosive dynamic in recent Bolivian history.3 
Although there is widespread sympathy among consumers for 
local artists, global media companies—and especially American 
companies—are viewed with distrust. Our research showed little 
or no popular concern for their loss of  income, nor is there a 
compelling account in circulation of  how those losses impact the 
lives of  most Bolivians. 
Intellectual property (IP) enforcement has also taken 
a backseat to the drama surrounding Bolivia’s role in the 
international community following the election of  president Evo 
Morales in December 2005. Widely hailed as the first “indigenous” 
president in the Americas, Morales has been a polarizing figure, 
generating strong support among poor Bolivians4 but also 
strong opposition among Bolivian elites and in the international 
community. Ties to Iran and to Hugo Chavez’s government in 
Venezuela have complicated external relations, especially with 
the United States. Following Morales’s expulsion of  the US 
ambassador in September 2008 for allegedly “conspiring against 
democracy” (BBC 2008), the Bush administration expelled Bolivia 
from the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA), which provides for duty-free exportation of  goods to 
the United States. 
While many had hoped that relations with the United States 
would improve following the election of  Barack Obama, this has 
not been the case: Obama ratified Bolivia’s expulsion from the 
ATPDEA, which took effect in July 2009 (USTR 2010). Tensions 
between the two countries have filtered down into other areas 
of  policy cooperation, such as anti-narcotrafficking and IP 
enforcement. Stalemate on these issues, compounded by the very 
small size of  the Bolivian music, film, and software markets and 
3 See, for example, the Water Wars in 2000, fought over efforts to 
privatize Cochabamba’s water supply at the insistence of  the World 
Bank, or the subsequent Gas Wars in 2003, fought over control of  
profits from Bolivia’s natural gas reserves.
4 Morales won a national recall referendum in August 2008 with 68% 
of  the vote. He was reelected for a second term in December 2009 
with 63% of  the vote.
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by uncertainty about Morales’s commitment to international 
trade agreements, may explain why the IIPA dropped its Bolivia 
reporting after 2006. Although there are still domestic forums for 
copyright industry interests—notably SENAPI—the IIPA’s long 
wish list of  legal reforms and stronger enforcement mechanisms 
appears to be, for the near future at least, a dead letter.
The Transformation of the  
Recorded Music Industry
Piracy has been widely blamed for the almost complete collapse 
of  Bolivia’s “legal” music-recording industry and for the exodus 
of  multinational record companies from the country. In 1995, 
recording industry profits in Bolivia were estimated to have been 
in the region of  $20 million. The three main national labels—
Discolandia, Lauro, and Heriba—accounted for around $2 
million of  these profits, but the lion’s share ($18 million) went 
to multinationals operating in the country (Ortiz and Herrera 
2003). During the 1990s, these included EMI Music, BMG, 
Warner Music, Universal Music, Sony Music, Leader Music, and 
Santa Fe Records. 
Levels of  audio and video piracy were already high in the mid-
1990s, but according to Andrés López (formerly of  Sony Music), 
it was Bolivia’s economic crisis in 1999 that decisively tipped the 
balance: piracy levels rose from around 65% in 1998 to 85–89% 
in 1999 (Tiempos del Mundo 2000). During this period, the national 
and international labels jointly organized a series of  campaigns 
to combat piracy, involving television advertisements, newspaper 
articles, raids on street vendors using hired police officers, and 
the mass destruction of  pirated media. The industry also lobbied 
for strengthening of  Bolivia’s 1992 copyright law (Law 1322), 
pressured the government to tackle copyright infringement, and 
criticized the state for treating piracy as a “social” rather than a 
“legal” issue (La Rázon 2000). They brought several cases against 
pirate producers to the courts, but the defendants, although 
generally caught red-handed and admitting guilt, went free after 
receiving judicial pardons. 
Throughout, the major labels made few concessions on 
pricing, and as the market for $15 CDs was undercut by pirated 
CDs selling for only one or two dollars, they came under severe 
intellectual property
video compact discs
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financial pressure. By 2003, recording industry profits in the country were estimated to have 
shrunk to around $0.6 million (Ortiz and Herrera 2003). All the major international labels had 
closed their Bolivian offices, Lauro and Heriba had both ceased operating, and Discolandia 
had cut its staff  from 150 to 20. Today, Discolandia—which recently celebrated its fiftieth 
anniversary—is the only major record label still operating in Bolivia. Rather than competing 
downmarket, it focuses on the niche market for high-quality recordings of  local acts, often 
incorporating glossy informative booklets.
The New Wave
The declining costs of  recording and sound editing also created opportunities for new, low-
cost, local labels. Bolivia now has many small digital studios, which are primarily recording 
local artists for regional markets. Typically, these labels sell their goods at very low prices that 
make them competitive with pirate products. 
A large proportion of  these new digital studios might be described as “informal” as 
they neither pay taxes nor register recordings with performers’ rights organizations (or with 
SENAPI). According to Wilson Ramirez of  Banana Records, some of  these labels have their 
origins in pirate production, which provides both an education in the Bolivian music scene 
and a means of  raising the capital necessary to set up recording studios. Some, he observed, 
continue their pirate practices clandestinely.5 
Because of  this growth at the low end, the larger cultural impact of  the collapse of  the 
Bolivian recording industry is hard to gauge. Although a number of  internationally recognized 
neo-folklore groups have stopped recording for the domestic market, our market observations 
suggest that overall the number of  new music releases in Bolivia has increased. Opportunities 
for producers and musicians from poor and indigenous backgrounds have expanded as the 
market for local music has grown. Profits, however, are extremely low, and contracts now 
typically require that the artist pay production costs to the studio and often take responsibility for 
distribution. The strongest rationale for these arrangements is not CD sales but the promotion 
of  live performances.
Although the new music labels are commonly criticized for inferior—and sometimes 
negligible—production values, this has not played a decisive role in the local markets where 
such products are sold. Nonetheless, a degree of  differentiation among the new producers 
is occurring as some seek out the higher-value segments of  the market, including roles in 
promotion. In this respect, pirate production seems likely to follow the path of  other countries 
documented in this report, in which the most successful pirate producers seek ways of  going 
legit. This may be particularly salient in Bolivia, where the move from the informal to the 
formal economy is an important and widely held aspiration.
5 Interview with William Ramirez, CEO of  Banana Records, October 2008.
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Formats and Reproduction Equipment
Because Bolivia has one of  the lowest Internet connectivity rates in South America, file 
sharing, digital downloads, and other forms of  web access to music and film remain relatively 
insignificant factors in the pirate economy.6 While the audio cassette remains important, 
especially in rural regions without electricity mains, the optical disc is now the dominant 
format. CD sales grew rapidly during the 1990s, but this market was largely restricted to the 
urban middle-class market. Poorer Bolivians, by contrast, tended to move directly from audio 
cassettes to VCDs (video compact discs) containing music videos, which became commonplace 
in the early part of  the decade. The rapid development of  this market was fueled by a flood of  
cheap VCD players and reproduction equipment, made in China and Taiwan and dumped on 
the Latin American market in the early 2000s. 
The first low-budget VCD productions by regional indigenous (originario) artists were 
released around 2003 and were followed by a wave of  productions by small-scale labels targeted 
at low-income regional audiences. More recent equipment can usually play multiple formats—
CDs, MP3s, VCDs, and now DVDs—allowing the smaller labels to piggyback on the existing 
consumer infrastructure and increasingly saturate the market. The CD/VCD continues to be 
the medium of  choice in Bolivia, however, because of  its lower cost—usually two-thirds of  the 
price of  blank DVDs.
A Short History of Bolivian Piracy
As in many other parts of  the world, large-scale music piracy emerged in Bolivia with the rise 
of  cassette technology. A market for cassette versions of  vinyl records developed in the 1970s 
with the introduction of  cheap radio/cassette players and expanded rapidly in the 1980s as the 
players became available even in rural peasant communities. The standard distribution method 
in poorer areas involved vendor ownership of  single “master” cassettes, from which copies 
could be made on demand. By the mid-1990s, much of  this artisanal labor had given way to 
imports, generally smuggled from Colombia and Paraguay, and later Peru as VCDs and DVDs 
gained popularity. Estimates of  the scale of  this transborder traffic vary. One vendor consulted 
in Sucre (in southern Bolivia) in 2007 indicated that some 70% of  the pirated music discs sold 
there were produced in Peru. Our research suggests that, by 2007, the actual percentage was 
probably much lower, with the difference attributable to increased local Bolivian production.
Regardless, the Peruvian trade remains significant and well known to most vendors. Most 
of  the pirated discs imported from Peru pass into Bolivia via the border town of  Desaguadero, 
situated near Lake Titicaca. According to vendor sources, Peru has several centers of  
pirate production, including the cities of  Juliaca, Arequipa, and Lima, which one vendor in 
Desaguedero described as “the mega-capital of  piracy.” In the early 2000s, distribution to 
6 In 2008, only 62,000 Bolivians had broadband Internet access, in a country of  over nine million. Only 
1.23% owned computers (Arratia 2009).
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local Bolivian vendors was controlled by a relatively small number of  dealers who traveled to 
Peru to collect merchandise or who acted as local agents for shipping, often by long-haul buses. 
According to a vendor based in Cochabamba, Bolivia, who labels his products “El Super 
Pirata DJ” (DJ Super Pirate):
When I began this business, at first there were only something like four majors, four 
large-scale pirates who delivered their CDs everywhere. They had their sellers who 
would take, let’s say two thousand CDs to one place, [where the vendors] would 
choose what they wanted and then take them off  to the next place. During the day 
they would dispose of  the two thousand CDs wholesale and in the night go to collect 
the money owed.
Local vendors often have contacts with dealers based in Desaguadero or La Paz, from whom 
they can order stock. The distribution network can also be used by vendors to dispatch new 
Bolivian releases to Peru for mass copying. This often includes the creation of  a new, color 
printed cover (lámina) by Peruvian graphic artists, using elements from the original cover or 
video images captured from the VCD itself. The creativity involved in the design of  these 
alternative covers is notable and contrasts with other parts of  the world (and certain areas of  the 
Peruvian market) where pirates favor artwork that is identical to, and ideally indistinguishable 
from, the original. 
On a visit to Desaguadero in April 2008, on one of  the town’s three weekly market days, 
there were no border-control police in sight. Bolivian traders and vendors crossed the frontier 
unimpeded. A mass of  stalls and shops located just inside the Peruvian border sold VCD 
recordings of  Bolivian artists, priced in bolivianos (the Bolivian currency) to simplify cross-
border sales. Single discs typically sold for 2Bs ($0.27 cents), with discounts for bulk purchases. 
One of  the Peruvian vendors explained that she had taken up selling VCDs in the past 
year, having previously run a stall serving hot food. She claimed that the profits from these 
two economic activities were much the same and very limited: “just enough to feed the 
family.” Another vendor—a man in his late twenties based in a shop opposite the Bolivian 
frontier—clearly worked on a larger scale. He had trained as a graphic designer but, like so 
many vendors interviewed, had been unable to find formal-sector employment. Although his 
business remained worthwhile, he explained that profits had dropped dramatically: Five years 
ago, “if  you invested $1,000, the next month you would have $3,000 or $4,000.” Now the 
wholesale price of  each pirated disc had gotten so low that profits depended on massive sales 
volume. The principle reason for this drop in prices was a reduction in the cost of  CD-burning 
equipment. He claimed that five years earlier a ten-disc burning tower had cost around $8,000, 
which meant that only a few pirate producers with access to significant capital were able to 
purchase equipment. These producers could then corner the market and maintain higher 
prices. When we spoke in 2008, the same equipment was retailing for about $600, making it 
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accessible to many more people, greatly increasing competition and leading to a reduction in 
the prices for copied discs. 
With wider availability of  disc-burning equipment, disc copying is increasingly done by the 
vendors themselves or by local suppliers. Because the actual discs are generally indistinguishable 
from one another, high-quality printed covers have become a key differentiator of  product 
categories, signaling quality and commanding higher prices. Some former producers and 
distributors of  copied discs have now branched out into printing and selling the covers—a 
business in which investment in expensive equipment still confers a technological advantage. 
Certain disc traders in La Paz now also specialize in selling laminas, which are largely produced 
in Peru. 
While finished pirated discs pass into Bolivia through Desaguadero, the trade in raw 
materials tends to flow the other way. Blank discs, plastic presentation “jewel” cases, and the 
small, clear plastic bags in which discs are sold first arrive in Iquique, Chile, from China or 
Taiwan. They are then trucked through Bolivia into Peru via Desaguadero. Similarly, Peruvian 
pirate producers often travel to La Paz to purchase disc-burning towers. The sale of  all these 
production components is presented as perfectly legal, although the IIPA claims that border 
duties on such goods are often avoided. Purchased in bulk (in 2008, in La Paz), blank CD/
VCDs could be had for about $0.10, DVDs for $0.15, and jewel cases for $0.11. 
Desaguadero’s economic dependence on the black market means that overzealous border 
officials are not tolerated, and attempts to crack down on smuggling have generally been met 
with fierce local resistance. Tensions rose in 2008, for example, after the Bolivian government 
attempted to end the smuggling of  natural gas canisters into Peru, where they can be sold for 
nearly five times the subsidized Bolivian price. In June 2008, a public ceremony to mark the 
opening of  a military garrison in Desaguadero, put there to control the border trade, was met 
by a violent mob of  townspeople, which drove the military detachment out of  town before 
ransacking and burning the customs offices. This incident led to much tighter policing of  
the roads leading to and from Desaguadero, which in turn has made the journey to purchase 
Peruvian-produced VCD and DVD discs more hazardous for Bolivian vendors and dealers. 
A greater chance of  arrest is just one of  several factors driving a shift toward local Bolivian 
production. A DVD vendor in La Paz who for many years had traveled to Desaguadero every 
Friday to purchase stock listed the advantages of  using local Bolivian suppliers. In addition to 
a lower risk of  police trouble, she saved a day per week in transit and the 40Bs ($6) bus fare. 
Customer satisfaction was also better: faulty DVDs could be returned to the supplier. However, 
she also stressed that her profits had fallen dramatically. A few years earlier, she had paid a 
wholesale price of  10Bs ($1.36) for DVDs, reselling them for 20Bs ($2.72) each, realizing a 
profit of  10Bs ($1.36) per disc. When we spoke in April 2008, the wholesale price was 5Bs and 
the retail price 8Bs, yielding a profit of  only 3Bs ($0.40) per DVD.7
7 Other accounts suggest that this localization of  production is not universal: variations in costs over 
time or by region appear to change this calculation for individuals or groups of  vendors. In 2008, jour-
nalist Wilfredo Jordán recounted the story of  a vendor based in El Alto, La Paz, who had abandoned 
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There is considerable variation in the prices of  pirated DVDs, VCDs, and CDs. Many 
factors affect price, including format, genre, quality of  the cover, degree of  vendor competition, 
region, and even locality within a particular town or city. In larger towns such as Potosí and 
Sucre, it is common for both pirated and legal VCDs (by regional artists) to be sold for the 
same standard price of  10Bs (when presented in a jewel case). Many local originario artists in 
these towns, whose work is typically destined for an indigenous migrant audience, own their 
own stalls in poorer market areas. Some distribute their discs to vendors personally, which 
provides them opportunities to monitor the circulation of  their work and build relationships 
of  trust with vendors. Such practices also reflect the ways in which patterns of  consumption 
map onto class and ethnic hierarchies in Bolivia. Original VCDs are widely available in the 
poorer peripheral market areas of  Sucre but almost never in the more upmarket city center, 
with its university, beautiful colonial churches, and tourists. Stalls in the city center tend to 
stock national and international genres—almost without exception pirated—but rarely local 
or regional originario artists. 
From Pirates to Legitimate Distributors?
In many Bolivian towns and cities, street vendors need municipal licenses, permits, or union 
membership in order to trade. In large cities, such as La Paz, there are several main unions 
representing vendor interests. Concern for local artists and the desire for wider legitimacy in 
the vendor community have led to some interesting efforts to address piracy at the union level, 
often in the form of  deals with local artists in which the unions agree to act as distributors. In a 
few cases—notably involving local rock groups—this model has been a success: vendor unions 
pay artists 7Bs per CD and retail them at 10Bs. However, attempts to scale up this model and 
to work with music producers have generally failed. As one producer put it: 
It was an ideal proposal, but it never worked because obviously we are talking about 
people who have lived all their lives from informal work. In other words, they never 
pay anyone a penny, never pay taxes, live from the work of  others, and are not 
disposed, nor are going to become disposed, to change this.
Union representatives, for their part, complain that producers wanted to dump out-of-date 
and second-rate recordings on them, which they would have been unable to sell. 
A particularly ambitious 2006 agreement brought together the La Paz Union of  Cinema 
Workers and the National Federation of  Small-Scale Audio-Visual and Music Merchants 
(dubbed a “pirate union” in many press reports). This agreement required vendors to refrain 
from selling VCDs or DVDs of  national and international films until after their exhibition in 
the selling of  children’s shoes for the more lucrative pirated-CD business. Initially, the family burnt 
their own discs, but finding that the material costs in Desaguadero were identical and the labor costs 
lower, they opted for weekly trips to purchase stock. According to Jordán, the number of  traders travel-
ing to the Peruvian border to acquire pirated discs continues to grow.
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La Paz cinemas—typically a three-month period following first release. According to union 
officials, it also stipulated protection in perpetuity for nationally produced films. Still more 
unusual was the role played by the city administration: the agreement was facilitated by the 
mayor’s office in La Paz, and police officers were assigned responsibility for enforcement.8
Implementation of  the agreement, however, broke down almost immediately. Press 
articles condemned the mayor’s office for giving “a green light to piracy.” Musicians’ rights 
organizations, such as the Bolivian Society of  Authors and Music Composers (Sociedad 
Boliviana de Autores y Compositores de Música), condemned the lack of  respect for the rights 
of  international artists. But the real damage was done by non-unionized vendors and members 
of  other vendor unions, who were not bound by the agreement and undercut its effectiveness. 
Indigenous Politics
Given the complexity of  current Bolivia-US relations and the recent loss of  US bargaining 
power following Bolivia’s expulsion from the ATPDEA, external pressure seems unlikely to 
achieve much change in Bolivian law or enforcement practices in the near future. Internal 
efforts to protect, control, and develop indigenous intellectual property may prove more 
consequential, however. According to the Foreign Trade Information System (Sistema de 
Informacion al Comercio Exterior) of  the Organization of  American States, “The current 
head of  SENAPI, appointed by President Evo Morales, has declared a ‘revolution’ at SENAPI, 
and currently the office seems to be focused on the registration of  traditional knowledge” 
(USTR 2008:40). Bolivia’s new national constitution, enacted in 2009, and the 2007 United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous People, which Bolivia was the first member 
country to sign, may also lead to new law protecting local and indigenous cultural production. 
The UN Declaration states:
Article 31
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well 
as the manifestations of  their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human 
and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of  the properties of  fauna and 
flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and 
performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop 
their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and 
traditional cultural expressions. (UN General Assembly 2007:11)
Originario-artist organizations have lobbied the government extensively to extend and 
protect their rights. The targets of  their anger, however, include existing music-rights-collection 
8 For background on the movie sector in La Paz and, secondarily, on film piracy and circulation, see 
Himpele (2008).
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societies, whom they accuse of  having excluded them and sometimes of  having plagiarized 
their work. This is the other side of  intellectual property politics in contemporary Bolivia—not 
simply the state’s inability to enforce anti-piracy laws and revise copyright legislation but also 
the belief  among some important stakeholders that existing international IP arrangements 
reinforce domestic and global inequality. This view is not marginal in the region: notably, 
it figures in the alternative regional trade agreement sponsored by Venezuela in 2003, The 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of  Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de 
Nuestra América, or ALBA), which counts Bolivia and eight other countries as members:
Within the general framework of  imbalanced relationships between North and 
South, the advantages of  the North are particularly evident in scientific and 
technological areas. The international regime of  intellectual property is strategically 
positioned to accentuate the imbalance. The system protects the strongest countries 
while leaving unprotected the areas in which the poorer countries of  the South 
have a real advantage: the genetic biodiversity of  their territories and the ancient 
knowledge of  indigenous and farming communities. (ALBA n.d.)
Precisely how the Bolivian government will manage these issues and develop and enforce 
its policies remains to be seen. But it seems clear that strong enforcement is not likely to be a 
viable solution—even if  deployed in support of  indigenous works. As in many other parts of  
the world, recorded music in Bolivia is acquiring a primarily promotional role with respect to 
artistic livelihoods, rather than a direct income-generating function. It would be unrealistic to 
expect Bolivia or other poor countries to reverse this trend. The important point, in Bolivia 
and in other countries with comparable economic positions, is that for the vast majority 
of  consumers and artists, this is not a change for the worse. The promotional function, in 
Bolivia, is not the remnant of  a once vibrant music business but rather a new source of  value 
for local artists and a sign of  the emergence of  a much wider music-consuming public than 
existed under the old model. How this music economy will provide pathways to legitimacy and 
more-than-marginal profitability is a different and critically important question. But it is not 
a new question in Bolivia, where most artists, even some of  the best-known regional singer-
songwriters, have always had to combine music with other forms of  economic activity. For all 
but a few musicians, this was no different in the era before ubiquitous piracy.
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About the Study
This account of piracy in Bolivia is based on the author’s interviews with musicians, record producers, 
and vendors in several parts of the country (as well as in neighboring Peru). It is part of a larger 
ethnographic research project entitled “Digital Indigeneity,” conducted in Bolivia between September 
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